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THE EMPIRE JUTE CO. LTD. & ORS.

v.

THE JUTE CORPORATION OF INDIA LTD. AND ANR.

OCTOBER 12, 2007

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[S.B. SINHA AND HARJIT SINGH BEDI, JJ.]

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996:

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s. 5—Arbitration agreement—Extent of judicial review—Contract for supply of raw jute—Dispute between parties regarding liability to pay carrying cost and quantum thereof—High Court though held that there existed arbitration clause, however, determined the question of liability to pay carrying charges, and referred the quantum

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to be decided in arbitration—HELD: Power of judicial review vested in the superior courts undoubtedly has wide amplitude but same should not be exercised when there exists an arbitration clause—Division Bench of High Court having opined that dispute between the parties was covered under the arbitration clause, it should not have proceeded

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to determine a part of dispute itself—As disputed questions of fact and law are required to be determined by arbitrator, all disputes between parties are, in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution, directed to be referred to arbitration in terms of clause 9.0 of the Sale Order and as indicated in the judgment—Constitution of India, 1950—

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Article 142.

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The Jute Commissioner, pursuant to Jute and Textile Control Order, 2000 made by Government of India in exercise of powers under s. 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, issued Production Control Orders to various jute mills including the appellant Company directing them to manufacture 'B' Twill Gunny Bags of specified quality upon compulsory purchase of raw jute from the Corporation. The Commissioner fixed the price of the Gunny Bags to be supplied by the appellant-Company as per the Schedule. Thereafter a contract for sale

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of raw jute was entered into between the appellant-Company and the respondent Jute Corporation of India Ltd. The appellant did not purchase raw jute from the Corporation alleging the same as of inferior quality, and filed a writ petition before the High Court, *inter alia*, challenging the power of the Commissioner to order compulsory purchase of raw jute, and prayed for a direction to him to desist from forcing the company to supply the gunny bags at the price fixed by him. However, before the single Judge the appellant made an offer to clear the backlog. An interim order was passed. The respondent issued a letter to the appellant to make the payment along with the carrying cost, which was objected to by the appellant. The matter was taken to the Division Bench, which upheld the liability of the respondent to pay the carrying charges and directed the parties to settle the quantum through arbitration. Aggrieved, the Company filed the instant appeal.

Partly allowing the appeal the Court

HELD: 1.1. The power of judicial review vested in the superior Courts undoubtedly has wide amplitude but the same should not be exercised when there exists an arbitration clause. In the instant case, in clause 9.0 of the contract for sale of jute, there exists an arbitration agreement. The arbitration agreement is of wide amplitude, by reason whereof not only the dispute relating to quality of the jute sought to be supplied by respondent no.1 may be gone into, but construction, meaning and operation and effect of the contract or breach thereof, if any, would have also fallen for determination of the arbitrator.

[Paras 14 and 18] [399-D; 400-C]

Central Bank of India Ltd., Amritsar v. The Hartford Fire Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR (1965) SC 1288, cited.

1.2. Construction of the agreement fell for consideration of the High Court. The Division Bench itself opined that the arbitration clause should be taken recourse to for the purpose of computation of the quantum of the carrying cost. The question of payment of carrying cost by the appellant in favour of the respondent would arise *provided the same is payable*. Payability of such carrying cost would, thus, depend

- A upon construction of clause 2.0 read with clause 5.0 of the sale contract. The Division Bench of the High Court took recourse to the arbitration agreement in regard to one part of the dispute but proceeded to determine the other part itself. Once the High Court was of the opinion that the dispute between the parties being covered by the arbitration**
- B clause should be referred to arbitration, it should not have proceeded to determine a part of the dispute itself.**

[Paras 16 and 18] [399-G-H; 400-A, C, D]

- C *M/s. Bisra Stone Lime Co. Ltd. etc. v. Orissa State Electricity Board and Anr.*, AIR (1976) SC 127 and *Sanjana M. Wig (Ms) v. Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd.*, [2005] 8 SCC 242, relied on.**

- D 1.3. The legal position has undergone a substantial change, having regard to Section 5 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 vis-à-vis provisions of Arbitration Act, 1940. Section 5 of 1996 Act takes away the jurisdiction of the Court. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever, the provision of the 1996 Act must be given effect to.**

[Paras 22 and 23] [402-C, D, E]

- E 1.4. As the disputed questions of facts as also of law are required to be determined by arbitrator, all disputes between the parties are, in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution, directed to be referred to the arbitration in terms of clause 9.0 of Sale Order and as indicated in the judgment. [Para 24] [402-E-F]**

- F CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 4877 of 2007.**

- G From the final Judgment and Order dated 15.12.2006 of the High Court of Calcutta at Calcutta in A.P.O. No. 291 of 2006 @ W.P. No. 962/2004, A.P.O.T. No. 401 of 2006 @ W.P. No. 969/2004, A.P.O.T. No. 402 of 2006 @ W.P. No. 967/2004, A.P.O.T. No. 403 of 2006 @ W.P. No. 966/2004, A.P.O.T. No. 404 of 2006 @ W.P. No. 972/2004. A.P.O.T. No. 405 of 2006 @ W.P. No. 971/2004 and A.P.O.T. No. 406 of 2006 @ W.P. No. 970/2004.**

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EMPIRE JUTE CO. LTD. v. JUTE CORPORATION OF INDIA LTD. [SINHA, J.] 391

WITH

C.A. Nos. 4878 and 4879 of 2007.

S. Bagaria, Ashok Jain, Pankaj Jain and Bijoy Kumar Jain for the Appellants.

Bikash Bhattacharya, Nandini Mitra, Subimal Mukherjee, Swati Sinha and Jayasree Singh (for Fox Mandal & Co.) for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S.B. SINHA, J. 1. Leave granted.

2. These appeals are directed against the judgment and order dated 15.12.2006 passed by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in APO No. 291 of 2006, A.P.O.T. No. 401 to 406 of 2006 in WP Nos. 962, 966, 967, 969, 970, 971 & 972 of 2004 and A.P.O.T. No. 399 of 2006 in W.P. No. 1566 of 2004 and A.P.O.T. No. 400 of 2006 in W.P. No. 973 of 2004 respectively. Factual matrix being in narrow compass, we will notice the relevant facts.

3. First Appellant is owner of a jute mill. In exercise of power conferred upon it under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, Government of India made an Order in the year 2000 known as "Jute and Jute Textile Control Order, 2000". By reason of the said order, powers were conferred on the Jute Commissioner to regulate stock of raw jute, fix price and control production thereof. In exercise of the power conferred upon him under the said Order, the Jute Commissioner issued Production Control Orders (PCO) to various jute mill owners directing them to manufacture 'B'Twill Gunny Bags of specified quality upon compulsory purchase of raw jute from the Corporation. Non-compliance of the directions was to result in application of penal provisions.

4. Indisputably, the Jute Commissioner sent the particulars of the said Production Control Order to the Jute Corporation of India Ltd. for the purpose of issuing necessary sale contract in order to enable the Jute manufacturers to take delivery of the requisite quantities of raw jute specified in the production control Order which the jute manufacturers

A were required to compulsorily purchase from the Corporation.

B 5. Indisputably, again the Commissioner in exercise of its power conferred under Section 3(3) of the Control Order fixed the price of 50 kg B-Twill jute bags for the delivery in the month of December 2002 provisionally at Rs. 1712.77p per hundred bags. The price for the said bags was arrived at upon taking into account hundred percent JCI in raw jute linkage i.e. the mills should compulsorily purchase raw jutes only from the Jute Corporation of India.

C 6. The quality of raw jute supplied by the respondent under the contract of sale was said to be of much inferior quality. However, factum of entering into a sale contract by the appellant with respondent No.1 is not in dispute. Admittedly, Appellants did not purchase raw jute from the respondent No.1 for the period of October 2003 to April, 2004. For fulfilling its undertakings, allegedly, they had to purchase raw jute on credit D from the open market.

E 7. Apprehending that no further raw material would be allotted to it, and/or punitive action will be taken against them, a writ petition was filed by the appellant before the Calcutta High Court *inter alia* praying for the following reliefs:-

F (a) A declaration be passed that the respondent no. 2 does not have any power, competence and/or authority to direct and/or order the petitioners to compulsorily purchase raw jute from the respondent no. 1 for effecting supply of B-Twill gunny bags of 665 gms.

G (b) A writ of and/or order and/or direction in the nature of mandamus be issued commanding the respondents not to force the petitioners to compulsorily purchase raw jute from the respondent No. 1 for effecting supply of B-Twill gunny bags of 665 gms under the various production control orders.

H (c) A writ of and/or order and/or direction in the nature of mandamus be issued commanding the respondents to allocate and supply consignment of raw jute as per productivity norms of Jute Manufacturers Development Council for manufacture

of B-Twill Jute bags of 665 gms.

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- (d) A writ of and/or order and/or direction in the nature of mandamus be issued commanding the respondent no. 2 to desist from forcing the petitioners to supply B-Twill gunny bags at the lower of the price prevailing for the period/month as mentioned in the individual Production Control Orders and that prevailing for the period subsequent thereto in the event your petitioners are otherwise unable to supply B-Twill gunny bags within the period as mentioned in the individual purchase order.

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8. Despite, making the aforementioned prayers, the appellant however, made an offer before a learned Single Judge of the High Court that the backlog would be cleared within six months in six equal installments after opening a letter of credit and if any payment is to be made by them, they will take necessary steps therefor. Pursuant to or in furtherance of the said interim order, the appellant deposited the amount, in question. On or about 6.7.2004, the Corporation issued a letter to the which reads as under :

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“Re: T.No. 212 of 2004

WP No. 962 & 966 to 973 of 2004

Dear Sirs,

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With reference to your letter nos. nil dated 30.06.2004 and 02.07.2004 on the above subject we would like to advise you to make payment arrangement of the 1/6 (one sixth) quantity of pending contracts along with the carrying cost within 7 (seven) days from the date of receipt of this letter, as per Clause 5.0 of the Sale Contracts which has already been intimated to you vide our letters dated 7.1.03, 17.11.03, 8.10.03, 4.12.03, 16.12.03, 26.12.03, 13.1.04, 16.1.04, 6.2.04, 19.2.04, 04.03.04, 19.3.04, 22.3.04 and 12.4.03.

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It may please be noted that since the relevant Sale Contracts have already been sent to you, the question of issuance of fresh contract does not arise. You are, therefore, advised to make payment arrangement along with carrying cost enabling us to take further

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A action in this regard.”

9. The Division Bench by its order dated 15.12.2006 directed :

B “There is no dispute that within the time mentioned in the said
clause the writ petitioners did not take delivery of the goods and
complained before the Court that for not taking such delivery, they
should not be deprived of future allotment. We have already
indicated that they themselves realized their fault and decided to
take late delivery by installments on payment of the price fixed
under the contract and prayed for a direction upon the appellant
C to allot further raw jutes in terms of the agreement. After getting
benefit of the interim order, they cannot now refuse to pay the
carrying cost for taking late delivery. The learned Single Judge
wrongly interpreted the said clause by holding that the present case
D was not one of furnishing defective Letters of Credit and that Clause
5.0 can be invoked only in cases of furnishing defective letters of
credit. In the case before us, undisputedly the writ petitioners had
the responsibility for taking delivery of the goods within the period
mentioned in the said clause. There is no dispute that within the
E same period delivery was not taken. Subsequently, by virtue of the
interim order, they got delivery and also prayed for a fresh allotment
on opening Letters of Credit. It is preposterous to suggest that the
purchasers who are under obligation in terms of agreement to lift
the goods within a specified period and for not taking delivery they
are required to pay carrying cost and delayed surcharges, will not
F be required to pay such penalty unless defect is found in the Letters
of Credit even though they lifted the goods beyond the stipulated
time. If we accept the aforesaid proposition, the purchasers can
avoid that clause by not taking delivery of goods or without opening
any Letters of credit in favour of the appellant by contending that
G there was no defect in the Letters of Credit.

H We, thus, find that the learned Single judge erred in law in holding
that the writ petitioners were under no obligation to pay the carrying
cost and other charges mentioned in clause 5.0 of the agreement
even if they do not lift the goods within the time stipulated therein

or if they do not furnish any letters of Credit in favour of the appellant. A

We, therefore, set aside the order impugned and hold that the appellant is entitled to get the carrying costs and other charges mentioned in Clause 5.0 of the agreement for breach of the terms of the agreement at the instance of the writ petitioners and that in this case, there has been violation of that clause at the instance of the writ petitioners. B

We, accordingly, allow these appeals and direct the learned advocate for the writ petitioners to handover the entire amount lying in the bank account pursuant to the interim order passed by the learned Single Judge inclusive of interest accrued thereon within a fortnight from today." C

10. Having said so, the Division Bench directed the parties to settle the amount through Arbitration in terms of agreement in regard to the quantum of the carrying charges payable by the appellant to the respondents stating; D

"It appears from the agreement between the parties that in case of any dispute arising out of the said agreement there is an arbitration clause. Whether the amount deposited with the learned advocate for the writ petitioners was sufficient to cover the carrying cost and other charges in terms of clause 5.0, is a question of fact and for resolving such disputes detailed investigation is necessary which is beyond the scope of the original writ applications. We were compelled to decide the question of applicability of the Clause 5.0 only because of the interim order granted by the learned Single Judge in favour of the writ petitioners although they ultimately did not press their grievance taken in the writ application. In such a situation, the learned Single Judge ought not to have granted any interim order in favour of the writ petitioners. Interim orders are granted in aid of the final relief claimed in judicial proceedings so that for not passing the interim relief, the final relief may not become inappropriate. But the law is equally settled that if the judicial E F G H

A proceedings fail in the long run, the Court granting interim order in
favour of the losing party should undo the harm, if done to the
successful party, in view of the interim order. By deciding the
question of applicability of Clause 5.0 and passing direction for
return of the money, we have merely undone the loss suffered by
B the appellant for the interim order passed by the learned Single
Judge.

We, therefore, direct the parties to settle the amount through
arbitration in terms of the agreement. The arbitration will adjust the
amount that will be handed over to the appellant by the learned
C advocate for the writ petitioners by virtue of this order while
assessing the actual amount payable by the writ petitioners to the
appellant due to taking delayed delivery of the goods.”

11. Mr. S. Bagaria, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of
D the appellant submitted that although there may not be any dispute with
the legal proposition that a suitor cannot take advantage of interim order
passed in his favour, but it is also trite that the interim order must be given
effect to in terms of the contractual obligations of the parties and, if in
terms thereof, the appellant was not liable to pay the carrying cost, clause
E 5.0 of the sale agreement being not applicable, they cannot be fastened
with the said liability. Strong reliance in this behalf has been placed on
*Central Bank of India Ltd., Amritsar v. The Hartford Fire Insurance
Co. Ltd.*, AIR (1965) SC 1288.

12. Mr. Bikash Bhattacharyya, learned senior counsel appearing on
F behalf of the first respondent, on the other hand, would submit that the
appellant had filed a writ petition on the premise that the statutory order
is not applicable. Such a prayer having been given a complete go-bye
and the appellant having prayed for passing an interim order to its benefit,
G by undertaking to clear the backlog of purchases in six instalments, it was
bound to pay the carrying charges. The Division Bench, Mr. Bikash
Bhattacharyya, would submit has rightly opined that the carrying charges
being payable, only quantum thereof would be subject matter of a dispute
within the meaning of arbitration agreement entered into and by and
H between the parties.

13. Before embarking upon the respective contentions of the learned A
counsel, we may notice the relevant terms of the contract:

2.0 Mode of delivery : For EX-GODOWN DELIVERY: The
responsibility of lifting the goods at their own cost within
_____ will lie with the buyers. B

2.1 In the event of buyer's failure to take godown delivery, within
the delivery period indicated above, an amount of Rs. 25/-
per qtl. Per month shall be levied over and above the price
indicated at Annexure-II. The Corporation shall have the
option to cancel the contract for the failure of the buyer to lift C
the goods by _____ and to exercise any and/or all the options
as stipulated at (i), (ii), (iii) & (iv) of Clause No. 16.0 of the
contract.

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5.0 *Payment terms* : Through confirmed and irrevocable Letter D
of Credit and/or Bank Draft/Pay Order preferably through a
nationalized bank at Kolkata covering the full value of the
entire quantity of jute covered by is contract and other
incidental costs to be signed by the buyers and furnished to E
us by 26.03.04 at the latest. In case the Letter of Credit
furnished by the buyer within the stipulated date as indicated
above, was found to be not acceptable to JCI, the same would
be returned to the buyer for amendment and for the period
taken by the buyer for resubmission of the Letter of Credit F
after necessary amendment, the buyer shall be liable to pay
carrying cost at the rate of Rs. 25/- per quintal per month or
part thereof.

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8.0 *Procedure for claim settlement* : All claims on account of G
quality shall be settled according to Bye-Laws & Rules of
EIJ&HE. The allowable moisture regain percentage shall be
18% for July, August, September and October and 16 % for
the remaining 8 months, November to June. The buyers shall H

A clearly indicate the extent of the claims (in terms of percentage) on quality and condition. No joint inspection shall be arranged and no claim shall be entertained by the Corporation unless the buyers clearly indicate the extent of claim in the manner mentioned herein above and within the time specified in the bye-laws and rules of the EIL&HE.

B In case of EX-GODOWN DELIVERY, the weight shall be determined at the point of delivery ex-godown based on weight recorded on lorry challan or the certificate of weighment signed by the authorized representative of the buyers and the Corporation. For this purpose the certificate to be given may be in the Form of Annexure-III.

C Based on the settlement of claim for quality, condition and weight if the buyers are found to be entitled to recover any amount from the Corporation, payment should be made within 15 days from the date of receipt of the debit note.

D 9.0 *Arbitration* : All disputes or differences whatsoever arising between the parties put of/or relating to the construction, meaning and operation or effect of this contract or the breach thereof shall be settled by arbitration of the Indian Council of Arbitration and the award made in pursuance thereof shall be binding on both the parties.

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F 16.0 In the event of any delay or failure on the part of the buyer in making payment arrangement acceptable to JCI within the stipulated period under the contract and/or his/their failure/refusal to take delivery of the contracted quantity as per Clause 4.1 of the contract as also to perform any of the terms of the contract, the Corporation shall have the right to exercise any and/or all of the following options:

- G (i) Canceling the contract;
- H (ii) Canceling the contract and charging the buyers for

difference, if any, between the contract prices and the market price on the date of canceling the contract. A

(iii) Canceling the contract and selling the goods in any manner deemed fit by the Corporation and charging the buyer for the difference between the contract price and the not value realized from such after adjustment of all expenses incurred by the Corporation in this regard; and B

(iv) To realize any other amount which the Corporation might have to pay for retaining the goods inclusive of carrying charges wherever applicable. C

14. Construction of the contract entered into by and between the parties is in question before us. There exists an arbitration agreement. The Arbitration Agreement is of wide amplitude; by reason whereof not only the dispute relating to quality of the jute sought to be supplied by the respondent No.1 may be gone into, the construction, meaning and operation and effect of the contract or breach thereof, if any, would have also fallen for determination of an Arbitrator. D

15. It is not correct to contend that clause 8.0 provides for procedure for claim settlement. The said provision in regard to the quality of jute supplied has in our opinion nothing to do with clause 9.0. The arbitration agreement entered into by and between the parties is independent of clause 8.0. It is now well settled that when there exists an arbitration agreement, the writ court ordinarily would not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to enter into the dispute. E F

16. The learned Single Judge embarked upon the question of construction of the agreement. In a sense, the Division Bench overturned the said decision. Construction of the agreement therefor fell for consideration of the High Court. Division Bench, as noticed hereinbefore, itself opined that the arbitration clause should be taken recourse to for the purpose of computation of the quantum of the carrying cost. The question of payment of carrying cost by the appellant in favour of the respondent would arise provided the same is payable. Payability of such carrying cost would, thus, depend upon construction of clause 2.0 read H

A with clause 5.0 of the sale contract.

B 17. Respondent, no doubt, could have taken recourse to clause 16.0 of the agreement in terms whereof it could realize any amount which the Corporation might have to pay. Disputed fact was required to be gone into before a definite opinion could be arrived at as to whether in the facts and circumstances, the obligation to pay the carrying cost was applicable.

C 18. The power of judicial review vested in the superior courts undoubtedly has wide amplitude but the same should not be exercised when there exists an arbitration clause. The Division Bench of the High Court took recourse to the arbitration agreement in regard to one part of the dispute but proceeded to determine the other part itself. It could have refused to exercise its jurisdiction leaving the parties to avail their own remedies under the agreement but if it was of the opinion that the D dispute between the parties being covered by the arbitration clause should be referred to arbitration, it should not have proceeded to determine a part of the dispute itself.

E 19. Similar question arose for consideration in *M/s. Bisra Stone Lime Co. Ltd. etc. v. Orissa State Electricity Board and Anr.*, AIR (1976) SC 127 wherein it was held that the High Court may refuse to exercise its jurisdiction, if there exists a valid arbitration clause stating;

F “24. It is then submitted that this Court should not use its discretion in favour of arbitration in a matter where it is a pure question of law as to the power of the Board to levy a surcharge. This submission would have great force if the sole question involved were the scope and ambit of the power of the Board under Sections 49 and 50 of the Act to levy a surcharge, as it was sought to be initially argued. The question in that event may not have been G within the content of clause 23 of the agreement. But all questions of law, one of which may be interpretation of the agreement, need not necessarily be withdrawn from the domestic forum because the court has discretion under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act or under Article 226 of the Constitution and that the court is better

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posted to decide such questions. The arbitration clause 23 is a clause of wide amplitude taking in its sweep even interpretation of the agreement and necessarily, therefore, of clause 13 therein. We are therefore, unable to accede to the submission that we should exercise our discretion to withhold the matter from arbitration and deal with it ourselves.

20. A similar view was taken by this Court in *Sanjana M. Wig (Ms) v. Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd.*, [2005] 8 SCC 242 holding:

“12. The principal question which arises for consideration is as to whether a discretionary jurisdiction would be refused to be exercised solely on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy which is more efficacious. Ordinarily, when a dispute between the parties requires adjudication of disputed question of facts wherefor the parties are required to lead evidence both oral and documentary which can be determined by a domestic forum chosen by the parties, the Court may not entertain a writ application (See *Titagarh Paper Mills Ltd. v. Orissa SEB and Bisra Stone Lime Co. Ltd. v. Orissa SEB*)”

13. However, access to justice by way of public law remedy would not be denied when a lis involves public law character and when the forum chosen by the parties would not be in a position to grant appropriate relief.

21. Relying on some of the earlier decisions of this Court, this Court held:

“It may be true that in a given case when an action of the party is dehors the terms and conditions contained in an agreement as also beyond the scope and ambit of the domestic forum created therefore, the writ petition may be held to be maintainable; but indisputably therefore such a case has to be made out. It may also be true, as has been held by this Court in *Amritsar Gas Service* and *E. Venkatakrishna* that the arbitrator may not have the requisite jurisdiction to direct restoration of distributorship having regard to the provisions contained in Section 14 of the Specific

A Relief Act, 1963; but while entertaining a writ petition even in such
a case, the court may not lose sight of the fact that if a serious
disputed question of fact is involved arising out of a contract qua
contract, ordinarily a writ petition would not be entertained. A writ
petition, however, will be entertained when it involves a public law
B character or involves a question arising out of public law functions
on the part of the respondent.”

22. The legal position has undergone a substantial change, having
regard to Section 5 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 vis-à-
C vis provisions of Arbitration Act, 1940. The said provision reads as under:-

“5. Extent of judicial intervention – Notwithstanding anything
contained in any other law for the time being in force, in matters
governed by this Part, no judicial authority shall intervene except
where so provided in this Part.”

D 23. In terms of 1940 Act, even a civil suit could have been
entertained subject of course to exercise of the court’s jurisdiction under
Section 21 thereof. Section 5 of 1996 Act takes away the jurisdiction of
the Court. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever, the provision of the
E 1996 Act must be given effect to.

24. As the disputed facts as also the law are required to be
determined by the Arbitrator, we are of the opinion that all disputes
between the parties should be directed to be resolved upon taking recourse
to the arbitration agreement contained in clause 9.0 of the Sale Order.

F 25. We therefore, direct;

(a) In exercise of a jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution,
in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, all disputes and
differences between the parties be referred to the arbitration in terms of
G clause 9.0 of the contract.

(b) Reference to arbitration would be deemed to be one under the
1996 Act.

H (c) The parties would be at liberty to approach the High Court for

any other or further direction(s).

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(d) The learned Arbitrator would make an Award within a period of four months from the date of entering into reference.

(e) All amount deposited by the appellant with the learned advocate on record towards the carrying charges should be paid to the second respondent, wherefor an appropriate receipt would be given.

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(f) Such payment shall be without prejudice to the rights of the parties before the Arbitrator and shall be subject to any other or further order or direction that may be issued by the learned Arbitration in his Award.

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26. These appeals are allowed to the aforementioned extent. In the facts and circumstances of this case, the parties shall pay and bear their own costs.

R.P.

Appeal partly allowed.

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